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Abstract
One of the most influential tests of the expectations hypothesis is Mankiw and Miron (1986),
who found that the spread between the long-term and short-term rates provided predictive
power for the short-term rate before the Fed’s founding but not after. They suggested that the
failure of the expectations hypothesis after the Fed’s founding was due to the Fed’s practice
of smoothing short-term interest rates. We show that their finding that the expectations
hypothesis fares better prior to the Fed’s founding is due to the fact that the test they employ
tends to generate results that are more favorable to the expectations hypothesis during
periods when there is extreme volatility in the short-term rate.
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1. Introduction
One of the most influential tests of the expectations hypothesis is Mankiw and Miron
(1986), henceforth MM, who “confirm the failure of the expectations theory using recent data” but
“find that the expectations theory works much better during some previous monetary regimes. In
particular, for data prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve, the slope of the yield curve has
substantial predictive power for the path of the short rate.”
1 Specifically, they find that the spread
between the long-term rate and the short-term rate explains a significant portion of the long-term
change in the short-term rate before the Fed’s founding but not after. They conjecture that the
failure of the expectations hypothesis (EH) after 1914 resulted from the Fed smoothing interest
rates.
We show that MM’s finding is due to the fact that the test they employ tends to generate
results that are more favorable to the EH during periods when there is extreme volatility in the
short-term rate. When this feature of the test is accounted for, the results obtained are essentially no
different before the founding of the Fed than after. Specifically, we show that MM’s finding that
the spread between the long-term and short-term rates explains a significantly large portion of long-
term changes in short-term rates is due to three observations when the short-term rate was unusually
volatile. All three of these observations occurred during the financial panic of 1907 and are subject
to measurement error.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we summarize MM’s test procedure.
We show that the test they use tends to generate results that are favorable to the EH when the EH
does not hold and that this tendency becomes stronger the more variable the short-term rate is
relative to the long-term rate. A detailed reevaluation of MM’s 1890-1914 results is undertaken in
Section 3. The conclusions are presented in Section 4.2
2. The Test of the Expectations Hypothesis
The EH can be thought of as the equilibrium condition that binds a long-term, n-period
interest rate, rt
n, and a sequence of expected future levels of a short-term, m-period rate up till n-m =
(k-1)m periods in the future, where k = n/m is an integer. That is,











(1) states that the n-period rate is equal to the average of the market’s expectation at the
beginning of period t,E t,o ft h es e r i e so fm-period rates over the term of the n-period rate plus a
constant risk premium, θ.
2
The test of the EH that MM employ is derived by assuming that expectations are rational,
i.e.,




t mi    η ,
where ησ η tm i iid  ~( ,) 0
2 . (2) is then substituted into (1) to yield








   

 






The EH is normally not tested using (3) because the interest rates are unit root or, perhaps more
correctly, near-unit-root processes. Rather, a variable, Zt , is subtracted from both sides of the
above equation such that the resulting variables are stationary. Subtracting Zt from both sides of
(3) and rewriting yields
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The conventional test of the expectations theory is obtained by parameterizing (4) as
1 MM (1986, p. 213).3
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The ordinary least-squares estimate of β is































where the bar indicates that the variable is adjusted for the mean. Note that if the null hypothesis is
true, i.e.,



















E β 1, independent of the choice of Zt .
2.1 Estimates of β When the EH Does Not Hold
While hypothesis tests are frequently derived under the maintained hypothesis (e.g., the
Dickey-Fuller unit root test), tests so derived may have low power because they admit a very
limited number of alternative data-generating processes.
3 Indeed, they may not admit the true data-
generating process. More importantly for our analysis, because (1) will not describe the true data-
generating process for the long-term rate and the short-term rate when the EH does not hold,
estimates of β need not equal zero when the EH is false. Moreover, because  β depends on the
variance of Zt and the covariance between Zt and rt
m and rt
n, the results will be sensitive to the
choice of Zt . In the EH hypothesis testing literature, Zr tt
m  . With this choice of Zt , it is easy to
show that estimates of β will be positive even when the EH does not hold.
2 Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) argue that (1) is exact in some special cases and that it can be derived as a
linear approximation to a number of nonlinear expectations theories of the term structure.
3 The evolution of such tests is to widen the array of admissible possibilities under the alternative. This has happened in
the unit-root-testing literature, e.g., Perron, 1989.4
The intuition for this result is easily illustrated with a simple, albeit extreme, example.


















n and ε t
m are independent iid stochastic processes with zero means and variances, σ n
2 and
σ m
2 , respectively. Substituting rt
m for Zt and rewriting (5) as
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it is easy to show that
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2 . Note that P
Nlim 
 β is positive even when the long-term and short-term rates are
independent. For example, if k  2 and the short-term rate is twice as variable as the long-term
rate, P
Nlim  .
  β 33.F u r t h e r m o r e , β tends to get larger as k and δ increase.
2.2 Generalizing the Result
The fact that  β tends to be positive when the EH does not hold can be illustrated more
generally, by parameterizing (3) before the short-term rate is subtracted from both sides, i.e.,
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Subtracting rt
m from both sides of (11) and parameterizing, yields
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Note that (12) reduces to (5) if and only if β =1, i.e., only if the EH is true. Hence, if (5) is











































where the bar denotes that the variable has been adjusted for the mean. The second term on the


















Noting that σσρ δ nm n /
2  ,w h e r eρ is the coefficient of correlation between rt
n and rt

















The bracketed term in (15) can be either positive or negative; but it is strictly negative when
the short-term rate is more variable than the long-term rate, i.e., δ >1—a fundamental prediction of
the EH. Hence, this test will tend to generate positive estimates of β even when the EH does not
hold. Moreover,  β will tend to be larger the larger the variance of the short-term rate relative to the
variance of the long-term rate.
3. MM’s 1890-1914 Results Revisited
3.1. MM’s Evidence
MM estimate (5) (with Zr tt
m  ) using both monthly and quarterly data, but they present
results only for the quarterly data. In MM’s application, r
m is the rate on 3-month time loans, rt
3,
and r
n is the rate on 6-month time loans, rt
6, both at New York banks. These rates are presented in6
Figure 1 for the period 1890-1958.
4 Estimates of (5) using monthly and quarterly data, respectively,
are presented in panels A and B of Table 1 for MM’s subperiods. The results using monthly data
are very similar to the quarterly results—which are identical to MM’s. For the remainder of the
paper, only results using monthly data are presented.
5
Based on their results, MM argue that the EH performs well during the 1890-1914 period
and conclude (MM, p. 217)
“athough data from this period do not fully confirm the expectations theory, the
slope of the yield curve does contain substantial information on the path of the
short rate.”
Support for the EH is considerably weaker after 1914. Not only is  β much smaller after the Fed’s
founding (indeed, negative after 1933), but the estimates of R
2 suggest that the rate spread explains
none of the long-term change in the short-term rate.
3.2. The Variability of the 3-month Rate
Figure 1 shows that during the period 1890.01-1914.12 the 3-month rate exhibits periods of
high volatility, both absolutely and relative to the 6-month rate. This is particularly true when the
yield curve is inverted, which is the case for 32 observations. In these instances, the yield curve
inverts because short-term rates increase relative to the long-term rate. When the 32 observations of
the inverted yield curve are deleted, the variance of the 3-month rate declines by nearly 40 percent
(from 2.23 percent to 1.42 percent). In contrast, the variance of the 6-month rate is essentially
unchanged, declining from 1.08 percent to 1.04 percent. These observations also have a relatively
large affect on ρ. The estimate of ρ is 0.94 when these observations are deleted and 0.87 when
4 We would like to thank Mankiw and Miron for providing us with the data. Their source is Andrew (1910) for the
period 1890-1909. For the period 1910-1958, they collected the data independently from the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle.
5 The qualitative conclusions of this paper are the same with quarterly data.7
they are not. These observations increase δ and reduce ρ, suggesting that they could account for
the larger estimate of β prior to the Fed’s founding.
3.3. The Financial Panic of 1907
Within the group of inverted yield curve observations, the financial panic of 1907 stands
out. For the three months of the financial panic—1907.11, 1907.12, and 1908.01—the 3-month rate
rose dramatically relative to the 6-month rate, causing the yield curve to invert. The spread between
the 6-month and 3-month rates widens to –800, –300, and –400 basis points during these three
months, respectively. In all other months for the full sample, the absolute value of the spread was,
at most, 200 basis points (once, in August 1914). The results in Section 2 suggest that MM’s
finding may be particularly sensitive to these observations.
3.3.1 Measurement Issues
Since the essence of the EH is the market’s ability to predict the future level of the short-
term rate, there is no particular reason to believe that the EH should fare better when the short-term
rate increases dramatically and temporarily relative to the long-term rate. Nevertheless, some
analysts might object to deleting these observations solely for this reason. Consequently, it is
important to note that these three observations are also subject to measurement error. The existence
of measurement problems in MM’s data is well documented (James, 1978, Fishe and Wohar, 1990,
and Mankiw, Miron, and Weil, 1987, 1990). For one thing, from 1890 to 1933, a usury provision in
the National Banking Act prohibited national banks from charging a higher rate than that fixed by
state law or 7 percent if no state law existed (James, 1978, pp. 79-88). The State of New York had a
usury law that set the ceiling on various interest rates, including those on time loans, at 6 percent.
Consequently, the 3- and 6-month rates did not exceed 6 percent before 1903 and the 6-month rate
was frequently at the 6 percent level for months at a time.8
Fishe and Wohar (1990) have identified other specific measurement problems with MM’s
interest rates. Specifically, they (Fishe and Wohar, 1990, p. 968) note that these rates
“do not always represent market transactions. There were many months in which
no business was conducted in the loan market, primarily because of financial panic
or distress, and in these months only a ‘nominal’ loan rate was reported. The
nominal rate was arbitrarily set at the usury ceiling in New York, which was 6
percent over this period.”
Fishe and Wohar conduct an independent investigation of a major data source, the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle (C&FC)—a popular business magazine of the time. They use Andrew (1910)
as their source up to 1908 and the C&FC for the period thereafter. Andrew’s convention was to
report the average weekly rate on time loans of different maturities from C&FC for weeks ending
on Friday. Andrew also indicates dates on which (1) no transaction occurred at the quoted rate, (2)
an unknown commission was paid in addition to the legal rate of 6 percent when the ceiling rate
was reported, or (3) one of the two rates was not reported.
6 When one or more of these
circumstances arise, Fishe and Wohar identify the observation as being subject to measurement
error. Using this criterion, Fishe and Wohar identify the observations on 1907.11 and 1907.12 as
being subject to measurement error.
There is also a measurement problem with the January 1908 observation that has been
overlooked. Andrew’s weekly data are averages of daily data for weeks ending Friday. Andrew’s
usual practice is to report for the month of January the weekly average for the full week ending
Friday even if only the last day of the week occurred in January. For some unknown reason,
6 It seems unlikely that Fishe and Wohar have identified all observations that are subject to measurement error. It also
seems unlikely that the C&FC reported all cases where no business was conducted or where a commission was paid.
Moreover, James (1978) indicated that banks frequently required borrowers to maintain a compensating balance to raise
the effective rate, but the C&FC did not report instances of banks requiring compensating balances. Finally, Andrew
(1910) frequently presents rate ranges rather than a specific rate. When this occurred, MM and Mankiw, Miron, and
Weil (1987) used the mid-point of the quoted range. The ranges tend to be much wider (in some cases 400 basis points)
when interest rates are at or above the usury limit. Consequently, observations when the rates are at or above 6 percent
tend to be less precise than when rates are below 6 percent. For all of these reasons, potential for measurement
problems exists whenever one or the other of the rates is at or above the usury limit.9
Andrew deviated from this practice in 1908. In January 1908, Andrew’s observation for the week
ending January 3 is the daily average for only two days, January 2 and 3.
7 This is the only instance
where Andrew split the reporting week in this fashion. On both of these days the 3-month rate was
reported at 10 percent and the 6-month rate was at the usury limit of 6 percent. The following week
both rates were reported at their usury ceiling levels. Hence, these rates were either unreported or
effective only for a very short period. In any event, the January 1908 rate on 3-month time loans
used by MM is not representative of the monthly average rate.
3.3.2 The Effect of Extreme Observations on MM’s Results
While all of the observations that exhibit sharp changes in the 3-month rate relative to the 6-
month rate can affect MM’s results, it is instructive to focus on the three very extreme observations
during the financial panic of 1907. Table 2 reports estimates of (5) for the period 1890.01-1914.12,
excluding and including these three observations. These results reveal the importance of these
observations to MM’s results. While deleting these three observations has a relatively small effect
on the estimate of β, R
2 drops dramatically—by nearly half. The effect of these observations on
the R
2 occurs because these observations have a very large effect on the total sum of squares, TSS,
but very little effect on the residual sum of squares, RSS. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which
shows a scatter plot of the independent variable and dependent variable, along with the estimated
regressions with and without these three observations. The regression line excluding these
observations nearly falls on the line with these observations. Therefore, the RSS is nearly the same
whether these observations are included or excluded. The TSS is considerably larger when these
observations are included, however. As a result, including these observations gives the impression
that the rate spread explains a relatively large proportion of the variation in the long-term change in
the short-term rate.
7 Likewise, the rate reported for the last week of 1907 is based on the average for the last two days of 1907.10
3.4. The Effect of the High-Variance Observations on MM’s Results
Even the estimate of R
2 of 20 percent exaggerates the predictive power of the rate spread.
The reason is that observations when the variance of the 3-month rate is high cause a shift in the
mean of the dependent variable. The effect of this is shown in Table 3, which reports estimates of
(5) over various partitions of the data. The first column of Table 3 shows the estimates for the 234
months when the 3-month and 6-month rates were unequal. As one would expect, the estimates of
β and R
2 are not affected by deleting the observations when the rate spread was zero. The
estimates are very sensitive to whether the yield curve is positively sloped or inverted, however.
When the yield curve is positively sloped (202 observations), the results are nearly identical to those
for the period 1915.01-1933.12—the estimate of β drops to 0.42 and the spread accounts for only 4
percent of the variation in the long-term change in the short-term rate. Hence, this test provides no
support for the EH over periods when the yield curve was positively sloped.
When the yield curve is inverted, however, the test appears to provide stronger support for
the EH, in that the estimate of β is 0.66 (though significantly different from 1) and the rate spread
“explains” about 78 percent of long-term changes in the short-term rate. In this case, however, the
apparent support for the EH is due solely to the three months during the financial panic of 1907.
When these observations are deleted, as in the fourth column of Table 3, the evidence for the EH
vanishes. The estimate of β drops to 0.21 and is not significantly different from zero, and the rate
spread explains none of the long-run change in the short-term rate.
Figure 3, which presents the estimated regression lines corresponding to the regressions in
the second and fourth columns of Table 3 and the estimated regression from Table 2, illustrates
what accounts for the marked change in the results. The estimate of β tends to be larger when the
yield curve is inverted because the average level of the dependent variable, ( / )( ) 12 3
33 rr tt   ,a n dt h e11
independent variable, () rr t t
63  , tend to be negative when the short-term rate spikes up one month
and returns to the previous month’s level the next. The reverse is also true. The left- and right-hand
sides of (5) tend to be positive when the short-term rate declines sharply one month only to return to
the previous month’s level the next. Hence, the estimate of β increases because the short-term rate
is more variable and not because of a marked change in the market’s ability to predict the short-term
rate.
3.5. Accounting for Extreme Observations and the Inverted Yield Curve
The importance of the effects of these extreme observations and the inverted yield curve on
the conclusion that the EH fared better before the Fed’s founding than after is illustrated in Table 4.
The first column of Table 4 presents estimates of (5) where the yield spread is partitioned into (1)
the three extreme observations, (rr t
n
t
m  |fp); (2) the 297 remaining observations, (rr t
n
t
m  |nfp); and
(3) a dummy variable, dum, which equals one when the yield curve is flat or inverted and zero
otherwise. The estimate of β drops to 0.34 when the effects of the extreme observations and the
inverted yield curve are accounted for. Moreover, the yield spread for the 297 remaining
observations has virtually no explanatory power. This is seen by comparing the estimates in
column 2 with the estimates in column 1. The estimate of R
2 drops only slightly when the rate
spread is deleted, suggesting that the spread has little predictive power for the long-term change in
the short-term rate. Indeed, comparing the estimates in the first column of Table 4 with those in the
second column of Panel A in Table 1 shows that MM’s conclusion, that the EH works better before
the Fed’s founding than after, is nearly entirely due to the fact that the test they use tends to
generate results that are favorable to the EH when the short-term rate changes markedly relative to
the long-term rate. This conclusion is tested formally by estimating (5) over the period 1890.01-
1933.12, allowing for the separate effects of the rate spread pre- and post-1915. Indeed, the12
estimate of the coefficient post-1915 is somewhat larger and about as precisely estimated; however,
the null hypothesis that the estimates of β pre- and post-1915 are equal cannot be rejected once the
effects of the extreme observations and the inverted yield curve are accounted for. The F-statistic is
1.31. Hence, when the effect of increased volatility of the 3-month rate is accounted for, there is no
more evidence supporting the EH before the Fed’s founding than after.
4. Conclusions
Mankiw and Miron (1986) find that the EH is less-soundly rejected before the founding of
the Fed than after. They argue that their finding is due to the marked change in interest rates from a
stationary process to a near random walk at about this time. They attribute both the change in the
stochastic process of interest rates and the failure of the EH to the Fed’s policy of smoothing interest
rates.
We show that Mankiw and Miron’s conclusion—that the EH fares better prior to the Fed’s
founding than after—is due to the fact that the test they employ tends to generate results that are
more favorable to the EH when the short-term rate is more variable than the long-term rate. The
effect is particularly strong when there are unusually large changes in the short-term rate relative to
the long-term rate. Specifically, we show that MM’s conclusion is due largely to three extreme
observations in the short-term rate during the financial panic of 1907. When the effect of these
observations is accounted for, this test does not generate results that are more favorable to the EH
before the Fed’s founding than after. While extreme observations sometimes provide the most useful
information, this is not the case here. Not only is there no reason to suspect that the market’s ability
to predict the short-term rate—the essence of the EH—improves when there are large, temporary
changes in the short-term rate, but these observations are subject to measurement error, which makes
their use suspect.13
While there is no doubt that the behavior of interest rates changed sometime after the Fed’s
founding, these findings tend to weaken the case for MM’s conjecture that the change in the behavior
of interest rates that occurred about the time of the Fed’s founding was due to a policy of interest rate
smoothing. What accounts for the marked change in the behavior of interest rates at about the time
of the Fed’s founding is a topic of future research. Our analysis also leaves open the broader
question of the relative importance of the EH before and after the Fed’s founding. Given that the
results are sensitive to the test used and marked change in the behavior of interest rates, answering
the question may be extremely difficult.
8
8 To see that the results are sensititive to the test, we test the EH before the Fed’s founding by estimating the
parameterized version of (3). The estimate of the slope coefficient on the moving average of the 3-month rate is
β  0975 .a n d R
2 0673  . . Moreover, the hypothesis that β  1 is not rejected, suggesting that EH held before the
Fed’s founding. If, however, one tests the EH by testing restrictions implied by the EH on a VAR consisting of the 3-
and 6-month rates using the Lagrange multiplier test proposed recently by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), the Lagrange
multiplier statistic is 101.37. The EH is easily rejected.14
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TABLE 1 The Predictive Power of the Spread
Panel A: Monthly data
Period 1890-1914 1915-1933 1934-1951 1951-1958
Constant -0.24 -0.07 0.06 0.04




m  0.67 0.42 -0.23 -0.34
(0.04) (0.16) (0.13) (0.24)
R
2 0.38 0.04 0.06 0.02
D.W. 0.81 0.70 0.77 0.49
s.e. 0.66 0.41 0.07 0.12
Number of Obs 300 228 207 93
Panel B: Quarterly data
Period 1890-1914 1915-1933 1934-1951 1951-1958
Constant -0.29 -0.06 0.06 0.04




m  0.76 0.42 -0.25 -0.33
(0.06) (0.20) (0.16) (0.26)
R
2 0.40 0.03 0.06 -0.01
D.W. 2.06 1.88 1.77 1.73
s.e. 0.59 0.42 0.07 0.13
Number of Obs 100 76 69 31
Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.16
TABLE 2 The Effect of the Financial Panic of 1907













Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.17
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Constant -0.17 -0.01 -0.23 -0.41




m  0.64 0.42 0.66 0.21
(0.06) (0.13) (0.05) (0.16)
R
2 0.42 0.04 0.78 0.01
D.W. 0.82 0.78 0.89 0.64
s.e. 0.63 0.64 0.55 0.47
N 234 202 32 29
Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.18
TABLE 4 Another Look at the Effect of the Financial Panic of 1907
1890.01-1914.12 1890.01-1914.12 1890.01-1933.12
Constant 0.04 0.26 -.02
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08)















m  |post-1914 -- -- 0.66
-- -- (0.17)
R
2 0.41 0.39 0.32
D.W. 0.87 0.95 0.78
s.e. 0.65 0.65 0.57
N 300 300 528
Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses.19
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Figure 2: The Effect of the Financial Panic Oservations
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